🔍 Read the full analysis: Trade Wars In The AI Age on ThorstenMeyerAI.com
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TL;DR
A Nov. 17, 2026, article by Thorsten Meyer examines how trade patterns are changing as US imports shift toward Vietnam and AI-linked goods account for a large share of recent global trade growth. It also revisits evidence that the gains from trade can coexist with lasting job losses in exposed communities. The source does not establish that AI caused the trade shifts or specify which policies will follow.
US imports from Vietnam reached $205 billion in the first nine months of 2026, close to the $215 billion imported from China, according to US Census Bureau figures cited by Thorsten Meyer. In a Nov. 17 article, Meyer links that shift to a wider account of trade’s uneven effects and reports that AI-related goods supplied 47% of world trade growth in the first half of 2026, based on World Trade Organization data.
The import figures mark a sharp change from 2017, when US purchases from China were still more than ten times those from Vietnam, according to Meyer. The 2026 figures cover only the first nine months, so they do not provide a full-year comparison. The article does not identify which products or companies account for the change, or establish that tariffs, AI, or any single policy caused it.
The WTO figures cited in the article show that goods used to run AI made up 14.8% of world goods trade in the first half of 2026 while accounting for 47% of its growth over that period. These are measures of trade composition and growth, not evidence that AI alone drove the expansion. The article does not give a more detailed breakdown of the goods included in the category.
Meyer’s broader point is that trade can increase overall economic gains while imposing concentrated costs on particular workers and places. He cites research on the US “China shock,” which found that in more exposed regions, 86% of factory jobs lost to Chinese imports had not been replaced by other local jobs. The article says the shock peaked around 2010 and that its effects were still visible in 2019.
Trade Shifts Reach Workers and Supply Chains
The Vietnam-China comparison matters because import sourcing affects where goods are made and which industries and communities face adjustment. But the figures alone cannot show whether production moved from China to Vietnam, whether US demand changed, or what share of imports is connected to AI. The data establish a change in the value of imports, not its cause.
The labor evidence adds a distributional dimension. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage explains how trade can benefit both trading partners overall, but national gains do not guarantee that workers who lose jobs can readily find comparable work nearby. The cited 86% local replacement figure illustrates why trade can remain politically contentious even when its aggregate benefits are real.
AI-related goods’ reported share of trade growth also points to the economic importance of products used in AI systems. It does not show that AI itself is responsible for the increase, nor does it predict how many jobs will be created or lost. For readers, the key distinction is between a growing trade category and proven effects on employment, prices, or productivity.
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From Comparative Advantage to China Shock
Meyer grounds the article in David Ricardo’s 1817 theory of comparative advantage: countries can benefit from trade by specializing in what they produce at a lower opportunity cost, even when one country is more productive in both goods. The theory describes potential aggregate gains; it does not say how those gains are shared or how quickly displaced workers find new jobs.
The article traces the expansion of global trade after the Second World War, including the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995. Trade as a share of world GDP rose from 26% in 1970 to 60% in 2008, then stood at 57% in 2024, according to World Bank data cited by Meyer.
China’s share of global manufacturing exports grew substantially in the decades before and after it joined the WTO in 2001. US goods imports from China rose from $19 billion in 1991 to $539 billion in 2018, according to Census Bureau data cited in the article. Research by David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson found that the effects on some communities were more persistent than economists had expected. Meyer also notes that US factory employment had begun declining before China joined the WTO, so Chinese imports were not the sole cause of the longer-term decline.
“Thus, England would give the produce of the labour of 100 men for the produce of the labour of 80.”
— David Ricardo, as quoted in Thorsten Meyer’s article
Causes Behind the Import Shift
The figures cited do not explain why US imports from Vietnam rose relative to imports from China. They also do not show whether the change reflects firms relocating production, different goods entering the market, shifts in consumer demand, or other factors. The first-nine-month comparison should not be treated as a complete account of 2026.
The article does not specify the products covered by its category of goods that AI runs on, or provide enough detail to independently assess how the WTO attributed 47% of first-half trade growth to that category. It also does not establish a causal connection between AI development and the movement of supply chains. The longer-term employment effects of current trade changes are not yet known.
Full-Year Trade Data Will Add Detail
A full-year 2026 comparison would show whether the first-nine-month import pattern continued, but Meyer’s article does not identify a release date for further figures. More detailed product and industry data would help clarify which goods account for the Vietnam and China totals and how much of the change reflects sourcing decisions.
Further WTO data and methodological detail could clarify how AI-related goods were defined and how their contribution to trade growth was calculated. Until then, the reported figures describe an emerging pattern rather than its causes or likely consequences. The article also offers no specific forecast or policy announcement tied to the data.
Key Questions
How much did the United States import from Vietnam and China in the first nine months of 2026?
According to US Census Bureau figures cited by Thorsten Meyer, the United States imported $205 billion in goods from Vietnam and $215 billion from China during the first nine months of 2026.
WTO data cited by Meyer say goods that AI runs on represented 14.8% of world goods trade and 47% of its growth in the first half of 2026. The article does not provide a detailed list of goods in that category.
Does the import data prove that production moved from China to Vietnam?
No. The figures show the value of US imports from each country, but do not establish why the totals changed or whether specific production shifted from China to Vietnam.
What does the cited 86% figure measure?
It refers to factory jobs lost to Chinese imports in more exposed US regions that were not replaced by other local jobs, according to research summarized by Meyer. It is not a measure of all US factory job losses.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
